

1 Plaintiffs hereby submit this strict reply to Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to
2 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

3 I. ARGUMENT

4 A. PLAINTIFF CONSTRUCTIVELY COMPLIED WITH THE COURT'S MARCH 12, 2010 5 ORDER TO FILE AND SERVE A RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

6 Plaintiff was directed in an order by this court on March 12, 2010 to file a response to the
7 Motion to Dismiss by March 26, 2010. Plaintiff electronically filed her Response on March 26, 2010
8 at 4:31 p.m., one minute after the cut-off time for filing on that Friday. This should be considered
9 constructive filing and harmless error, since it is not unusual that the court's web site may be bogged
10 down with filings on a Friday afternoon, causing it to run slowly, or that an individual's computer
11 may be running slowly. While the "Date Received" time stamp on the Confirmation Receipt
12 received by Plaintiff after the electronic filing is "3/29/2010 8:30:00 am," no real harm or prejudice
13 to defendants has occurred.

14 Defendant was also served, or constructively served with a copy of the Response to
15 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Defendant admits that it received an e-mail with a link to the SCAT
16 website that contained the response. Plaintiff was not aware of any specific rule only allowing one
17 way to serve the Defendant with her response. It is hardly burdensome to go to a web site and open a
18 link – it does not require "surfing" around the internet, or doing a Google search to find the
19 document. It only requires the depressing of the button on one's mouse, as simple as opening an e-
20 mail. While an attorney may not have chosen to serve Defendants in this manner, Plaintiff, *pro se*,
21 was unaware of any prohibition against serving the document to Defendant in this manner.
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1 Plaintiff requests the court find that her Response to the Motion to Dismiss was
2 constructively, or factually, filed and served and that the Motion to Dismiss should not be granted on
3 the grounds that it was not filed and served strictly as ordered.

4 **B. THE COURT MAY RESTRAIN ANY FURTHER ACTIONS BEING TAKEN ON THE**
5 **AWV PROJECT UNTIL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW IS COMPLETE, AND PLAINTIFF**
6 **CLEARLY SUBMITTED EVIDENCE THAT SHOWS A FINAL AGENCY DECISION**

7 NEPA case law makes it clear that EISs that appear to be merely a *post hoc* rationalization of
8 an already-chosen project alternative are inappropriate and contrary to the spirit and the letter of
9 NEPA. If it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and walks like a duck, then it must be a duck – so,
10 too, with a final agency action. Attached to Plaintiff’s brief in response to Defendants’ Motion to
11 Dismiss was a copy of the MOA between the City and the State agreeing to IMPLEMENT the bored
12 tunnel alternative, evidence of a final agency action. Seattle city ordinances were passed and signed
13 by the mayor for the bored tunnel alternative only. Additional final decisions have been made that
14 cement the bored tunnel alternative as the chosen one:

15 1. There have only been two alternatives presented in the DEIS – the tunnel alternative and the no
16 action alternative. This is clearly a violation of NEPA, and taken as a whole with other actions taken
17 by the Defendant, indicates a decision has already been made – a final agency action.

18 2. Defendant has hired a firm to do public relations to promote the tunnel alternative to the public,
19 and produced a video that creates a highly biased view that would persuade the viewer to certainly
20 select the tunnel alternative.

21 3. Defendant has already begun sending out RFPs for bids from contractors for the bored tunnel
22 project option, but no RFPs for bids for other options. This, combined with the actions mentioned
23 above, certainly looks, quacks, and walks like a federal agency action.
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1 4. Defendants can't have it both ways. On the one hand, they claim that Plaintiffs claims are not
2 ripe for review because there has been no "final agency action." This is a disingenuous argument
3 because on the other hand, every action they have taken is in the nature of a decision has already been
4 made rendering the EIS process as simply a pro forma way to rubber stamp that decision, or a *post*
5 *hoc* rationalization.

6 Early case law discussing this point shows that the *post hoc* rationalization problem was
7 quickly detected early in the life of NEPA. Contrary to Defendant's allegation that the Court can only
8 provide the remedy in this case of directing WSDOT to prepare an EIS, the Court can restrain any
9 further action on the project until the proper environmental studies and NEPA/SEPA procedures have
10 been completed as required by law. The "presumption is that an action proceeding in violation of
11 NEPA should be enjoined..." Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
12 An injunction restraining an action that violates NEPA has been rightly termed "the vehicle through
13 which the congressional policy behind NEPA can be effectuated." Environmental Defense Fund v.
14 Froehlke, 477 F.2d 1033, 1037 (8th Cir. 1973). The policies underlying NEPA "weigh the scales in
15 favor of those seeking the suspension of all action until the Act's requirements are met..." Save Our
16 Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir. 1984). Without injunctive relief, "application of a
17 "rule of reason" would convert an EIS into a mere rubber stamp for *post hoc* rationalization of
18 decisions already made." Natural Resource Defense Council v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 95 (2nd Cir.
19 1975).

20 On these grounds, the court should DENY Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and allow
21 Plaintiffs the opportunity to enter into discovery and proceed to trial on the merits of the case.
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DATED this 28th Day of April, 2010

NATURAL RESOURCE LAW GROUP, PLLC

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DECLARATION OF SERVICE

I declare that a true and correct copy of the following document:

1. PLAINTIFFS' STRICT REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

was served on the following as indicated below:

Amanda Phily, Attorney General's Office
Deborah Cade, Attorney General's Office
State of Washington
7141 Clearwater Drive SW
Tumwater, WA 98501

Via e-mail delivery.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated this 28th day of April, 2010 in Seattle, Washington.

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